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For Avicenna, human minds were 
not in themselves formed for abstract 
thought. Humans are intellectual only 
potentially, and only illumination by 
the Angel confers upon them the 
ability to make from this potential a 
real ability to think. This is the Tenth 
Intellect, identified with the "active 
intellect" of Aristotle's De Anima. 
The degree to which minds are 
illuminated by the Angel varies. 
Prophets are illuminated to the point 
that they posses not only rational 
intellect, but also an imagination and 
ability which allows them to pass on 
their superior wisdom to others. Some 
receive less, but enough to write, 
teach, pass laws, and contribute to the 
distribution of knowledge. Others 
receive enough for their own personal 
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realization, and others still receive 
less. On this view, all humanity shares 
a single agent intellect - a collective 
consciousness. The final stage of 
human life, according to Avicenna, is 
reunion with the emanation of the 
Angel. Thus, the Angel confers upon 
those imbued with its intellect the 
certainty of life after death. For 
Avicenna, as for the Neo-Platonist 
who influenced him, the immortality 
of the soul is a consequence of its 
nature, and not a purpose for it to 
fulfill. 
The first certitude apprehended by 
the human mind, he says, is that of 
being, which is apprehended by means 
of sense-perceptions. The idea of 
being, however, is so deep-rooted in 
man that it could be perceived outside 
of the sensible. This refrigeration of 
the Cartesian ‘Cogito ergo sum’ 
appears to have two causes: intuition 
(Hads) is so powerful in Ibn Sina (see 
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in the Physics of the Danishnama the 
part that it played for him) that he 
bases himself here on a metaphysical 
apprehension of being; in addition, 
since the human soul, according to 
him, is a separate intelligence, which 
leads its own spiritual existence while 
being united with the body, it is 
capable of apprehending itself direct-
ly. 
The second certitude is that the 
being thus apprehended in man, and in 
every existing thing, is not present 
there of necessity. The essence of 
‘man’, ‘horse’ or ‘stone’ does not 
imply the necessity of the existence 
of a particular man or horse. 
Existence is given to actualized, 
concrete beings by a Being that 
differs from all of them: it is not one 
of the essences that have no existence 
in themselves, but its essence is its 
very being. The Creator is the First 
Cause; as a consequence of this theory 
the proof of the existence of God is 
restricted to Metaphysics, and not to 
Physics, as happens when God is 
proved to be the prime mover. 
Ibn Sina did not formulate the 
distinction between the uncreated 
Being and created beings as clearly as 
did Thomas Aquinas, but the latter 
does base himself on Ibn Sina's 
doctrine; only being is in God, God is 
in no genus and being is not a genus.
1
 
Ibn Sina maintains that God, as he 
conceives Him, is ‘the first with 
respect to the being of the Universe, 
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However, this apparent impetus of 
Ibn Sina is interrupted by the data of 
Plotinus, for they inspire the 
emanatist theory of creation. The 
Qur’an, like the Old and New 
Testaments, explains creation by a 
free act of will on the part of God. For 
Ibn Sina, by way of Plotinus, the 
necessary Being is such in all its 
modes-and thus as creator-and being 
overflows from it. Moreover, this 
emanation does not occur freely, and 
creation involves intermediaries, 
which are also creators. From the One 
can come only one. The necessary 
Being thus produces a single Intel-
ligence. This, having a cause, neces-
sarily possesses a duality of being and 
knowledge. It introduces multiplicity 
into the world; from it can derive 
another Intelligence, a celestial Soul 
and a celestial body. Ptolemy's system 
becomes the framework of creative 
emanation; emanation descends from 
sphere to sphere as far as a tenth pure 
Intelligence, which governs, not a 
sphere, but our terrestrial world, 
which is made, unlike the others, of 
corruptible matter. This brings with it 
a multiplicity which surpasses human 
knowledge but is perfectly possessed 
and dominated by the active Intellect, 
the tenth Intelligence. Its role is 
demonstrated in a poetic and 
symbolic form in the Recital of Hayy 
bin Yaqzan (Risalah Hayy bin 
Yaqzhan)3; a name that refers to the 
active Intellect itself. 
                                                 
3 ‚The Recital of Hayy bin Yaqzhan‛ is 
one of the Ibn Sina’s trilogies. The others 
recital are The Recital of the Bird (Risalah al-
Thayr) and The Recital of Salaman wa Abshal 
(Risalah Salaman wa Abshal). See Henry 
Corbin, Avicenna and The Visionary Recital 
(Texas: Spring Publication, Inc, University of 
Dallas Irving, 1980). 
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The philosophical origin of this 
active Intellect is the passage in the 
De Anima in which Aristotle refers by 
this name to the active part of the 
human soul. Ibn Sina irremediably 
mutilates the latter by taking away 
from it this active part, and with it 
it’s most noble action and its highest 
intellectual function: abstraction of 
intelligibles. This active Intellect, 
which, according to Aristotle, produ-
ces all intelligibles, is now a separate 
Intelligence. Thus the human soul 
receives them passively, and so 
cannot think except by leave of the 
Intellect; comprehension, knowledge 
and the sciences are now no longer its 
affair. It can elaborate only that 
which is given to it by the active 
Intellect. The latter produces not only 
these intelligibles but also all the 
substantial forms that are created in 
accordance with the models that it 
have conceived in conformity with 
the potentialities of matter. It is in 
this way; Ibn Sina replies to Plato's 
anxious question, that the concrete 
being can share in the Idea. The active 
Intellect has an ability which Plato 
sought for in vain: it apprehends the 
two series of relative perceptions, 
both the forms with their mutual 
relationships and the concrete beings 
with their mutual relationships; in 
addition, it apprehends their common 
repository, which is its own essence
4
 
A reply is also given to the question 
of Aristotle as to the provenance of 
form and the contribution of the Ideas 
to sensible beings  
The human soul by itself can 
attain only the first three degrees of 
abstraction: sensation, imagination 
and the action of estimation that 
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Atti XII congr. intern. The filosofia, ix, at 137-
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extracts individual non-sensible ideas. 
It then apprehends the intelligible that 
is given to it from outside. Intuition is 
due to its joining with the active 
Intellect. 
Being and intelligence overflow 
like a river from the necessary Being 
and descend to the extreme limits of 
the created. There is an equally full 
re-ascent, produced by creatures' love 
and desire for their creators, as far as 
the supreme Principle, which corres-
ponds to the abundance of this gift. 
This beautiful concept, which could 
derive only from a soul inclined 
towards religion, has been thought of 
as mystical. The Risala fi 'l-'ishq, 
‘The Epistle on Love’,
5
 however, is 
primarily a metaphysical explanation 
of the tendency of every being 
towards its good, and a physical 
explanation of the motion of the stars; 
they imitate in their fashion, which is 
material, the unceasing action of the 
pure Act. The spheres, in fact, thus 
imitate the unceasing desire of the 
celestial Souls which correspond to 
each one of them. The rational soul of 
man tends towards its good with a 
conscious motion of apprehension of, 
and love for, the active Intellect, and, 
through it, for the necessary Being, 
which is pure Good. In the highest 
states, however, it can tend directly 
towards the latter. 
Ibn Sina believed firmly in the 
immortality of the soul. Corruption 
cannot touch it, for it is immaterial. 
                                                 
5 Ibn Sina, Risalah fi al-Isyq (A Treatise 
of Love), this book was translated into English 
by Emil L. Fackenheim. Considering isyq 
(love) Ibn Sina also explains in his 
Rasail, Book 19 in Seven Chapter: (1) 
al-‘isy fi kully wahid min al-huwiyat, 
wujud al-isy fi al-basa-ith, wujud al-isyq 
fi al-shura al-nabatiyah, isyq al -nufus al-
hayawaniyah, ‘isyq al -dharafa wa al-
fityan liwajhi al hasan, ‘isyq al -nufus al-
ilahihim and khatimah.  
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The proof of this immateriality lies in 
its capability of apprehending the 
intelligibles, which are in no way 
material. He is much more hesitant on 
the question of the resurrection of the 
body, which he at first admits in the 
Shifa’ and the Najat, and then denies 
in the epistle A·Hawiyya, after 
indicating in the Risalah Hayy bin 
Yaqzan; that this dogma is often an 
object of temptations. He appears 
finally to have decided to understand 
it in a symbolic sense.
6
 
Among the fierce controversies to 
which Avicenna's thought has given 
rise is the discussion as to whether or 
not he should be considered a mystic. 
At first sight, the whole range of 
expressions that he uses to speak of 
love's re-ascending as far as to the 
Creator leads one to an affirmative 
interpretation-not in an esoteric way 
but in the positive sense of the love of 
God. The more one studies his 
philosophical doctrine, the more one 
finds that it illuminates these expres-
sions. The stages of the Sufis, studied 
in the Isharat, leave rather the 
impression of experiences observed by 
a great, curious and respectful mind, 
which, however, does not participate. 
Ibn Sina is a believer, and this fact 
should be maintained in opposition to 
those who have made of him a lover 
of pleasure who narrowly escapes 
being a hypocrite, although there is so 
much seriousness in his life and such 
efforts to reconcile his philosophy 
with his faith-even if he is not always 
successful. He is far above the gnosis 
impregnated with occultism and 
paganism to which some would 
                                                 
6 Henry Corbin, Avicenna and The 
Visionary Recital, (Spring Publication, Inc: 
University of Dallas Irving Texas, 1980. About 
‚The Recital of Hayy ibn Yaqzhan‛, pp. 123-
151.  
reduce him. Is he a mystic in the exact 
sense that the word has in Catholic 
theology? It reserves the word for one 
whose whole life is a great love of 
God, in a kind of intimacy of heart 
and thought with Him, so that God 
holds the first place in all things and 
everything is apprehended as related 
to Him. 
Had it been thus with Ibn Sina, his 
writings would give a totally different 
impression. Nevertheless, at bottom 
he did perhaps apprehend God. It is in 
the simple expression of apprehension 
through the heart, in the secret of the 
heart (sirr), in flashes, however short 
and infrequent, that we are led to see 
in him a beginning of true mystic 
apprehension, in opposition to the 
gnosis and its symbols, for at this 
depth of the heart there is no longer 
any need for words. 
One doubt, however, still enters 
in: his general doctrine of appre-
hension, and some of the terms that 
he uses, in fact, in texts on sirr, could 
be applied at least as well to a 
privileged connation with the active 
Intellect, and not with God Himself   
Again, on this question, the absence 
of his last great work, the ‘Eastern 
Philosophy’, precludes a definite 
answer. 
This irreparable lacuna in the 
transmission of his works does not 
allow us to understand in what 
respects he wished to complete, and 
even to correct, Aristotle, as he states 
in the prologue. As a hypothesis, 
suggested by his constant efforts to 
express the concrete and by his 
biography, we may suppose that he 
wished to make room for the oriental 
scientific tradition, which was more 
experimental than Greek science. The 
small alterations made to Aristotelian 
logic are slanted in this direction. In 
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metaphysics, it is probable that he 
was shocked by the contradictions 
between Plotinus and Aristotle that 
were evident in the texts which the 
knowledge of the time attributed to 
one single author, and that he wished 
to resolve these anomalies by giving 
new explanations. 
Although Avicenna believed that 
the world is a creation of God, he also 
believed, under the influence of 
Aristotle, that both God and the 
world existed eternally. As Aquinas 
and other theists acknowledge, this 
view is not self-contradictory because 
creation does not necessarily require a 
beginning in time. Avicenna, of 
course, noted that in itself the world 
is only ‚possible‛ and requires a cause 
for its existence. God, on the other 
hand, exists necessarily and brought 
the world into being from nothing. 
This act could either have a beginning 
or be beginning less and endless. 
Other Islamic philosophers put 
forward the kalam argument, made 
famous in recent times by William 
Lane Craig, which shows that the 
universe had to have a beginning in 
time. F.F. Centore observes that one 
defect of Avicenna’s thought was his 
assumption that the world necessarily 
emanates from God. 
Avicenna also introduced innova-
tive arguments to show that the 
human soul is immaterial and 
indivisible. He noted that each person 
is ineradicably aware of his/her 
existence as an individual self, a self 
that will permanently retain its 
individuality. 
 
Body and Soul  
In all these dealings with prophe-
cy, knowledge and metaphysics, Ibn 
Sina takes it that the entity involved 
is the human soul. In al-Shifa’, he 
proposes that the soul must be an 
incorporeal substance because intel-
lectual thoughts themselves are 
indivisible. Presumably he means that 
a coherent thought, involving con-
cepts in some determinate order, 
cannot be had in parts by different 
intellects and still remain a single 
coherent thought. In order to be a 
coherent single unity, a coherent 
thought must be had by a single, 
unified intellect rather than, for 
example, one intellect having one part 
of the thought, another soul a separate 
part of the thought and yet a third 
intellect having a third distinct part of 
the same thought. In other words, a 
coherent thought is indivisible and 
can be present as such only to an 
intellect that is similarly unified or 
indivisible. However, corporeal mat-
ter is divisible; therefore the 
indivisible intellect that is necessary 
for coherent thought cannot be 
corporeal. It must therefore be 
incorporeal, since those are the only 
two available possibilities. 
For Ibn Sina, that the soul is 
incorporeal implies also that it must 
be immortal: the decay and destruct-
tion of the body does not affect the 
soul. There are basically three rela-
tions to the corporeal body that might 
also threaten the soul but, Ibn Sina 
proposes, none of these relations 
holds true of the incorporeal soul, 
which therefore must be immortal. If 
the body were a cause of the soul’s 
existence, or if body and soul 
depended on each other necessarily 
for their existence, or if the soul 
logically depended on the body, then 
the destruction or decay of the body 
would determine the existence of the 
soul. However, the body is not a cause 
of the soul in any of the four senses of 
cause; both are substances, corporeal 
and incorporeal, and therefore as 
substances they must be independent 
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of each other; and the body changes 
and decays as a result of its 
independent causes and substances, 
not because of changes in the soul, 
and therefore it does not follow that 
any change in the body, including 
death, must determine the existence 
of the soul. Even if the emergence of 
the human soul implies a role for the 
body, the role of this corporeal matter 
is only accidental. 
To this explanation that the 
destruction of the body does not 
entail or cause the destruction of the 
soul, Ibn Sina adds an argument that 
the destruction of the soul cannot be 
caused by anything. Composite exis-
ting objects are subject to destruction; 
by contrast, the soul as a simple 
incorporeal being is not subject to 
destruction. Moreover, since the soul 
is not a compound of matter and 
form, it may be generated but it does 
not suffer the destruction that afflicts 
all generated things that are com-
posed of form and matter. Similarly, 
even if we could identify the soul as a 
compound, for it to have unity that 
compound must itself be integrated as 
a unity, and the principle of this unity 
of the soul must be simple; and, so far 
as the principle involves an onto-
logical commitment to existence, 




According to De Boer, Ibn Sina’s 
theory of human nature is dualistic. 
De Boer wrote: 
‚Body and soul have no essential 
connection with one another. All 
bodies are produced, under the 
influence of the stars, from the 
mingling of the Elements; and in 
this way the human body also is 
                                                 
7Edward Craig, Routledge’s Encyclopedia 
of Islamic Philosophy, p. 163. 
produced, but from a combination 
in which the finest proportion is 
observed. A spontaneous genera-
tion of the body, just like the 
extinction and restoration of the 
human race, is therefore possible. 
The soul however, is not to be 
explained from such mixture of 
the Elements. It is not the insepa-
rable Form of the body, but is 
accidental to it. From the Giver of 
Forms, that is—from the Active 
Spirit over us, every body receives 
its own Soul, which is adapted to 
it and too alone. From its very 
beginning each Soul is an indi-
vidual substance, and it develops 
increasing individuality through-
out its life in the body. It must be 
admitted that this does not agree 
with the contention that Matter is 
the principle of individuality. But 
the Soul in the ‚infant prodigy‛ of 
our philosopher. He is not a 
credulous man, and he often 
cautions us against too ready an 
acceptance of mysteries in the life 
of the Soul; but still he has the art 
himself of relating many things 
about the numerous wonderful 
powers and possible influences of 
the Soul, as it wanders along the 
highly intricate pathways of life, 
and crosses the abysses of Being 
and Not-Being‛.  
The speculative faculties are the 
choicest of all the powers of the Soul. 
Acquaintance with the world is 
conveyed to the rational soul by the 
External and Internal Senses. In parti-
cular a full account is given by Ibn 
Sina of his theory of the Internal 
Senses, or the sensuous spiritual 
faculties of representation, which 
have their seat in the brain. Medical 
philosophers commonly assumed 
three Internal Senses or stages of the 
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representative process: (1) Gathering 
the several sense perceptions into 
collective image in the fore part of the 
brain; (2) Transforming or remodeling 
this representation of the general 
sense, with the help representation 
already existing, thus constituting 
apperception proper, in the middle 
region; (3) Storing up the apperceived 
representation in the Memory, which 
was held to reside in the hinder part 
of the brain. Ibn Sina, however, 
carries the analysis somewhat farther. 
He distinguishes in the anterior 
portion of the brain the Memory of 
the Sensible, --or the treasure-house 
of the collective image—from the 
General or Coordinating Sense. 
Farther, he makes out Apperception, -
-the function of the middle region of 
the bran—to be in part brought about 
unconsciously, under the influence of 
the sensible and appetent life, as is 
the case also with the lower animals, 
and, on the other hand, to take place 
in part consciously, with the 
cooperation of the Reason. In the first 
case the representation preserves its 
reference to the individual thing, --
thus the sheep knows the hostility of 
the wolf, --but in the second case, the 
representation is extended to the 
Universal. Then, in the hinder part of 
the brain, the Representative Memo-
ry, or store-house of the representa-
tions formed by combined Sensuous 
impression and Rational Reflection, 
follows as a fifth power. In this way 
five Internal Senses correspond to the 
five External senses, although with 
quite another reference than the five 
Internal Senses of the Faithful 
Brethren. The question which is 
raised –as to whether one should 
farther separate Recollection, as a 
special faculty, from Memory, -
remains unanswered.  
At the apex of the intellectual 
powers of the Soul stands the Reason. 
There is indeed Practical Reason also, 
but in its action we have been only 
multiplying ourselves immediately: 
On the other hand, in Self Conscious-
ness, or the pure recognition of our 
essential nature, the Unity of our 
Reason is directly exhibited. But 
instead of keeping down the lower 
powers of the Soul, the Reason lifts 
them up, refining Sense-Perception, 
and generalizing Presentation. Rea-
son, which at first is a mere capacity 
for thought, becomes elaborated 
gradually, in that material which is 
conveyed to it by the external and 
internal senses, -into a finished readi-
ness in Thought. Through exercise the 
capacity becomes reality. This comes 
about through the instrumentality of 
experience, but under guidance and 
enlightenment from above,-from the 
‚Giver of the Forms‛, who as Active 
Spirit impart the ideas to the Reason. 
The Soul of man, however, does not 
possess any memory for the pure ideas 
of Reason, for memory always 
presupposes a corporeal substratum. 
As often then as the Rational Soul 
comes to know anything, that know-
ledge flows to it on each occasion 
from above; and thinking Souls do not 
differ in the range and contents of 
their knowledge, but in the readiness 
with which they put themselves in 
communication with the Spirit over 
us, in order to receive their 
knowledge.  
The rational Soul, which rules 
over that that which is under it, and 
comes to know the higher by men of 
the enlightenment given by the 
World-Spirit, is then the real Man,-
brought into existence, but as un-
mixed essence, as individual sub-
stance, indestructible, immortal. On 
this point the climes of Ibn sina’s 
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teaching mark it off from that Farabi; 
and, since his time, the assumption of 
the individual immortality of the 
human Souls, which have come into 
being, is regarded in the east 
Aristotelian, and the opposite 
doctrine as Platonic. Thus a better 
understanding prevails between his 
philosophy and the accepted religion. 
The human body and the whole world 
of sense furnish the Souls with a 
school for its training. But after the 
death of the body, which puts an end 
to this body forever, the Soul 
continues to exist in a less close 
connection with the World-Sprit. In 
this union, with the Spirit over us-
which is not to be conceived as a 
complete unification-the blessedness 
of the good ‘knowing’ souls consists. 
The lot of the other is eternal misery; 
for just as bodily defect lead to 
disease, so punishment is the neces-
sary consequence of evil conditions of 
Soul. In the same way too, the reward 
of Heaven are apportioned according 
to the degree of soundness or 
rationality which the Soul has attain-
ed in the life on earth. The pure Souls 
are comforted amidst the sufferings of 
Time by its prospect of Eternity.     
The highest is of course, reached 
only by a few; for on the pinnacle of 
Truth there is no room for many; but 
one posses forward after another, to 
reach the source of the knowledge of 
God, welling forth on its lonely 
height.
8
   
According to Fazlur Rahman, Ibn 
Sina stresses the intimate connection 
of mind and body. The soul in its real 
being is then an independent sub-
                                                 
8 T.J. De Boer, The History of Philosophy 
in Islam, translated by Edward R. Jones, B.D. 
(New York: Islamic Philosophy Inline, Inc), p. 
51. 
 
stance and is our transcendental self. 
Ibn Sina’s arguments for immortality 
of the soul are based on the view that 
it is a substance and that is not a form 
of the body to which it is attached 
intimately by some kind of mystical 
relation between the two. There is the 
soul which emerges from the separate 
substance of the active intelligence 
simultaneously with the emergence of 
a body with a definite temperament, a 
definite inclination to attach itself to 
this body, to care for it, and direct it 
to the mutual benefit. Further, the 
soul, as being incorporeal, is a simple 
substance and this ensures for it 
indestructibility and survival, after its 




Bit if at the transcendental level 
the soul is a pure spiritual entity and 
body does not enter into its definition 
even as a relational concept, at the 
phenomenal level the body must be 
included in its definition as a building 
enter into the definition of a (definite) 
builder. That is why Ibn Sina says 
that the study of the phenomenal 
aspect of the soul is in the field of 
natural science, while its transcenden-




The express his view of the 
Human Reason, Ibn Sina employs and 
explains poetical tradition, -a favorite 
proceeding in the Persian literature. 
First and foremost our interest is 
awakened by the allegorical figure of 
Hai ibn Yaqzan. It represents the 
ascent of the Spirit out of the 
Elements, and through the realm of 
Nature of the Souls, and of the Spirit, 
                                                 
9Fazlur Rahman, ‚Ibn Sina‛ in A History 
of Muslim Philosophy, edited and Introduced 
by M.M. Sharif (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassiwitz, 
1963), 489-90. 
10 Fazlur Rahman, ibid, p. 480-90. 
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up to the throne of the Eternal One. 
Hai presents himself to the 
philosopher in the form of old man 
with an air of youth about him, and 
offers his services as guide. The 
wanderer has been striving to reach 
knowledge of Erath and Heaven, by 
means of his outer and inner senses. 
Two ways open out before him, one 
to the West, the way of the Material 
and the Evil, the other to the Rising 
Sun, the way of Spiritual and ever-
pure Forms, and along that way Hai 
now conduct him. Together they 
reach the well of Divine-Wisdom, the 
fountain of everlasting youth, where 
beauty is the curtain of beauty, and 
light the veil of light, -the Eternal 
Mystery. Hai ibn Yaqzan is thus the 
guide of individual, thinking Souls: he 
is the Eternal Spirit who is over 
mankind, and operates in them.  
A similar meaning is found by our 
philosopher in the frequently remo-
deled late-Greek legend of the 
brothers Salaman and Absal. Salaman 
in the World man, whose wife (i.e., 
the World of the Senses) falls in love 
with Absal, and contrives by a 
stratagem to wile him into her arms. 
But before the deceive moment, a 
flash of lightning comes down from 
heaven, and reveals to Ansal the 
wantonness of the action which he 
had nearly committed, and raises him 
from the world of sensual enjoyment 




Therefore, Ibn Sina’s classifica-
tion these mental faculties into three 
groups. First, the group of vegetative 
faculties, in which humans and plants 
both share. They re concerned with 
the survival of the human being, 
growth through nutrition, and reser-
vation of the species through 
                                                 
11 T.J. De Boer,  p. 51. 
reproduction. They thus comprise 




 This group is followed by the 
faculties that make animals superior 
to plants, and are shared by human 
beings and animals. Typically, they 
allow the human being to be attracted 
to what it desires, and to be repelled 
by anything harmful arousing fear or 
anger. They comprise, in his view, 
two faculties: a faculty of motion and 
a faculty of comprehension or 
perception. Each is, in its turn, divi-
ded into other faculties: the motive 
faculty consists of an instinctive 
reaction, and a rational movement, 
permitting the human either to act or 
desist from action; comprehension is 
also divided into a perceptive faculty 
of the exterior world through the five 
senses—sight, hearing, smell, taste, 
touch—and one directed from within, 
by way of common sense, imagina-
tion, memory and reflection.
13
 
In the Book of al-Shifa, Ibn Sina 
says: 
‚You can have no doubt that all 
the vegetative and animal powers 
that we mentioned are found in 
man. But man has the additional 
power of perceiving intelligible 
reality; this distinguishes him 
from other kinds of animals, and 
is called the rational soul. It has 
two powers, one practical, the 
other for knowing; the two are 
called intellects in an equivocal 
sense. The practical intellect is a 
power that perceives things that 
                                                 
12 Ibn Sina, al-Najat, Cairo, al-Babi al-
Halabi, 1357 AH, p. 158; and al-Shifa, Tehran, 
Hajar, 1353 AH, Vol. I, p. 294). 
13 Ibn Sina, al-Najat, op. cit., p. 159-63; 
al-Isharat wal-Tanbihat, Leiden, 1892, Vol. I, p. 
125; al-Shifa, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 333; 
Muhammad Uthman Najati, al-Idrak al-hissi 
ind Ibn Sina, Dar al-Ma’arif, 1961, p. 117. 
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are related to bodily well-being 
in its particular conditions and 
the acts proper to it. It moves the 
body to act on the basis of an 
estimation it forms about it. The 
relationship of these practical 
things to the power for knowing 
gives rise to widespread common 
judgments which are not based 
on pure intellect. Their relation-
ship to animal appetitive powers 
gives rise to dispositions prepar-
ing man for action or passion. 
Their relationship to the inner 
senses, such as the estimative 
sense and the imagination, gives 
rise to arts, works and manage-
ment of everything that is gene-
rable or corruptible. If the intel-
lect dominates the powers of the 
body and has influence on them a 
praiseworthy and pleasant cha-
racter results. But if these powers 
dominate the intellect and are not 
influenced by it and it rather is 
influenced and led by them, a bad 
character results‛. 
 
This leads you to conclude that 
the soul is a simple substance, one in 
essence, as we will establish later. It 
has one orientation towards the Holy 
and another towards the body and its 
needs. For this double orientation it 
has two powers, each one perfecting 
the relationship between it and what 
it is dealing with. As it is orientated 
to the body it is not always receptive 
of natural influences, but as it is 
orientated to the Holy it always 
receives from it. The power for 
knowing is a power in which are 
engraved universal forms which are 
separated from matter, either of 
themselves or because of the action 
of the intellect in receiving them. 





According to Ibn Sina, a body 
unable to perceive knowledge, but the 
human soul has able to it. Ibn Sina 
says: 
‚A body is essentially unable to 
perceive intelligible forms. This 
act is only ascribed to animated 
bodies because of powers that are 
in them. A power that by its 
essence perceives intelligible 
forms is the subject of these 
forms and is a substance. But if it 
does not perceive by its essence 
but with the body, then strong 
objects of perception must tire, 
weaken and change the body; 
thus sight is weakened when very 
bright objects are seen; the same 
for hearing when sound is too 
powerful. But whenever the 
                                                 
14 In Arabic as Ibn Sina says in the Book 
of al-Shifa Book II, Chapter 5: 
 إٌببح١ت اٌمٜٛ ِٓ روشٔبٖ ِب ج١ّع أْ فٟ حشه فال ٚأٔج
جٛدِٛ ٚاٌح١ٛا١ٔت  أخشٜ لٛة ٌٗ بأْ ٠ض٠ذ ثُ اإلٔغبْ فٟ 
 عبئش عٓ بٙب ٠ّخبص اٌّعمٛالث إدسان ِٓ بٙب ّٔىٓ
 ٌٚٙب إٌبطمت ببٌٕفظ اٌّغّبة ٟ٘ ٚحٍه اٌح١ٛاْ أصٕبف
 ببالشخشان عمال ٚاحت وً ٚحغّٝ ٚعبٌّت عبٍِت فٛحبْ
 أحٛاٌٗ فٟ اٌبذْ بّصبٌح حخعٍك ألِٛس ِذسوت لٛة فبٌعبٍِت
بصتاٌخ ٚأفعبٌٗ اٌجضئ١ت  عٍٝ رٌه إٌٝ ٌٗ ِحشوت ٟٚ٘ بٗ 
 إٌظش٠ت اٌمٛة إٌٝ ٘زٖ ٚبٕغبت ع١ٍٗ ٠جّع سأٞ ِمخضٝ
 إٌٝ ِغخٕذة ١ٌغج اٌخٟ ٚاٌّشٙٛسة اٌزائعت اٌمضب٠ب ححذد
 إٌضٚع١ت اٌح١ٛا١ٔت اٌمٜٛ إٌٝ ٚبٕغبخٙب اٌصش٠ح اٌعمً
 ٚاالٔفعبي اٌفعً ٌمبٛي اإلٔغبْ بٙب ٠غخعذ ١٘ئبث ححذد
ببطٕتاٌ اٌمٜٛ إٌٝ ٚبٕغبخٙب  حغخٕبظ ٚاٌّخخ١ٍت وب١ٌّ٘ٛت 
 ٚبخغٍطٙب فبعذ وبئٓ وً فٟ ٚاٌخذب١ش ٚاألعّبي اٌصٕبئع
 األخالق حىْٛ عٕٙب اٌمٜٛ ٚأفعبي اٌبذْ لٜٛ عٍٝ
 حٕفعً ال ٚإْ ع١ٍٙب اٌمٜٛ حٍه ٚبخغٍظ اٌّشض١ت اٌح١ّذة
 اٌشر٠ٍت األخالق حىْٛ ٌٙب ٚحٕفبد حٍه عٓ ٟ٘ ٚحٕفعً عٕٙب
 بغ١ظ جٛ٘ش إٌفظ أْ ٘زا ٌه ٠حّصً ٚاٌزٞ          
 إٌٝ بٗ حٕصشف ٚجٗ ٌٚٙب بعذ ٔمشسٖ وّب اٌزاث أحذٞ
 ٚبحغب ِٚصبٌحٗ اٌبذْ إٌٝ بٗ حٕصشف ٚٚجٗ اٌمذط
 ٚب١ٓ ب١ٕٙب ف١ّب اٌعاللت بٙب حخُ ٚاحذة وً لٛحبْ ٌٙب ٘ز٠ٓ
 ٠مبً ال اٌبذْ إٌٝ إٌّصشف  ٚاٌٛجٗ إ١ٌٗ ِٕصشفت ٟ٘ ِب
ّٕصشفاٌ ٚاٌٛجٗ بٛجٗ اٌطب١ع١ت ا٢ثبس  دائُ اٌمذط إٌٝ 
 ِٕٗ اٌمبٛي
 حىْٛ اٌخٟ اٌى١ٍت ببٌصٛس إٌّخمشت اٌمٛة فٟٙ اٌعبٌّت ٚأِب 
 ٚلبٌٛٙب ٌٙب بخجش٠ذ٘ب ٚإِب بأٔفغٙب إِب اٌّٛاد عٓ ِجشدة
 .....اٌفعً ٠ىْٛ ٚلذ ببٌمٛة ٠ىْٛ لذ ٌٙب
 
The Concept of  Man in Ibn Sina’s  
Philosophy of Education 
 
Turats, Vol. 11, No. 1,  Mei  2015                                                                                                     73 
 
intellective power understands 
highly intelligible realities it 
grows stronger. The body grows 
weaker after the age of forty, 
while the intellect grows 
stronger. Thus we know that the 
soul understands by its essence. 
But everything that understands 
by its essence is a substance. 





Ibn Sina also says: 
‚If you observe very well you 
will also find that when you refer 
to yourself as "I" you mean 
something different from what 
you mean when you say "it". 
When you say "I" you are 
referring to your essence, but 
when you refer to any one of 
your members or bodily parts you 
say "it". Such a reference is 
distinct and separate from what 
is "I". So it is not "I" nor a part of 
"I", since "I" does not express a 
collection of "it" definitions, 
because the reality of the parts 
can be different from the reality 
of the whole. Therefore your use 
of the word "I" shows that it is 
something different from your 
body and different from any of 
its parts or attributes. That 
different thing is called the soul‛. 
                                                 
 15In Arabic as Ibn Sina says in the Book 
of al-Shifa, Book II, Chapter 5: 
 اٌّعمٛالث إدسان عٍٝ لٛٞ غ١ش بزاحٗ فبٌجغُ 
ُٚصفج ٚإّٔب  إْ ٚاٌمٜٛ ف١ٙب ٌمٜٛ اٌح١ٛا١ٔت األجغبَ بٗ 
 جٛا٘ش فٟٙ بزاحٙب اٌعم١ٍت ٌٍصٛس وبٔخّحال بزاحٙب أدسوج
 ٚسٚد عٕذ اٌىالَ ٌضَ اٌجغُ ِع بً بزاحٙب ححشن ٌُ ٚإْ
 عٕذ اٌبصش ٠ٚضعف ٚحغ١ّشٖ اٌجغُ حٟٛ٘ اٌشبلت اٌّذسوبث
 اٌم٠ٛت األصٛاث ٚسٚد عٕذ ٚاٌغّع ا١ٌّٕشة اٌّبصشاث حٛاسد
 اٌشبلت اٌّعمٛالث حعمٍج وٍّب ٌٍّعمٛالث اٌذساوت ٚاٌمٛة
 اإلدسان ٠ٚمٜٛ األسبع١ٓ بعذ اٌجغُ ٠ضعف ٚلذ ألٜٛ وبٔج
 جٛ٘ش فٙٛ بزاحٗ ِذسوب وبْ ِب ٚوً بزاحٙب ٌٍٕفظ أٔٗ فُعٍُ
 .جٛ٘ش فبٌٕفظ
 
Man has certain knowledge that 
his essence exists and he can have no 
doubt of this under any circum-
stance, but he can be unaware of any 
one of his members or of his whole 
body. But what is known is different 
from what is not known. Therefore 
his essence is different from his body 
and all the parts of his body...... 
The reality of each man is that 
substance which he refers to by the 
expression "I", or another addresses 
as "you". This is one in essence with 
different functions in the various 
parts of the body; these are the 
powers which are known by their 
distinct influence on single organs 
which do not have multiple 
operations. Between the soul and 
these functions there is a relation-
ship of dependence, since the soul is 
their source. This relationship is the 
reason why the operations of these 
powers can affect the soul and the 
soul can affect these powers, on a 
mutual basis. 
These powers of the soul can 
result in opposite operations, such as 
anger and pleasure, or joy and 
sadness. Whenever there is sensa-
tion, desire, anger, pleasure, joy or 
sadness the relationship of depen-
dence brings about a disposition in 
the subject of that power. If these 
operations go on repeatedly they 
affect the soul, giving it an 
inclination which takes over and 
becomes a character trait of that 
substance, rooted with the firmness 
of a habit. If the soul is ever 
impressed by the thought of 
something it admires or abhors, the 
above-mentioned relationship carries 
this impression to these powers and 
they are affected by it. Specific 
impressions are made on them, so 
that they either tremble or are 
resolute or overcome by passion etc. 
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Thus courage or cowardice, chastity 
or wantonness, goodness or evil 
result from undergoing these expe-
riences repeatedly, and they become 
a moral habit which can grow weak 
or strong. It is obvious that some are 
more prone to anger than others, 
while others are more ready to please 
or more courageous. 
The soul perceives separated 
intelligible things by their essences; 
what is not separated from matter it 
perceives by abstracting their uni-
versal forms from the senses. 
Perception is the realization in the 
perceiver of a representation of the 
form of what is perceived; this 
representation is in every way 
intellectual and is available to be 
viewed by an act of perception 
whenever one wishes. Perception is 
nothing but the very presence of that 
representation in the perceiver, and 
is nothing else. The representation of 
a thing which corresponds to the 
thing in every aspect is the perceived 
object; the object is not the reality 
which exists outside. Some percei-
ved objects have no outside sensible 
existence yet have a representational 
existence, such as geometrical forms 
and propositions connected [with 
these] which cannot conceivably be 
denied. But if the outside reality of 
the perceived thing were the object 
of perception then that perception 
would vanish once the reality itself 
vanishes, and other impossible 
consequences would also follow. So 
the design engraved [in the intellect] 
is the corresponding representation, 
and that remains and does not leave 
[the intellect].  
When a thing is present it is 
perceived visibly and sensibly, but 
when it is absent it is imagined, as 
we have representations of many 
things which are absent from us but 
we perceived before. When a 
universal meaning is formed from 
what is common among all the single 
things that you think of, among all 
the single things of its kind or its 
genus, it becomes intelligible. The 
first stage is like seeing Zayd with 
the sense of sight; the second is like 
imagining his form and having an 
inner representation of it after his 
absence; the third is like the 
universal meaning that is formed, 
such as the meaning of man, which 
belongs to this man and others of his 
kind. 
The sensation of a man includes 
various accidentals which are part of 
his reality but their disappearance 
does not affect his essence. Such are 
size, location, position and quality. 
Should any of these accidentals 
suddenly and circumstantially be 
replaced [by its opposite], this does 
not affect the reality of one's 
humanity. The sensation of man 
with these concomitant accidentals 
is because of the matter of which he 
was made. The abstraction (sic) and 
perception [of a man] take place by a 
circumstantial relationship between 
the sensation of him and his matter, 
making him present. Therefore the 
sensory representation of man is the 
appearance of his visible form upon 
the elimination of obstacles. 
Imagination is bringing this image 
present together with those 
accidentals by which it is persona-
lized and which express his indi-
viduality. The imagination cannot 
abstract absolutely, but only from 
the very relationship of sensing, so 
that in the absence of sensation the 
imagination continues to represent 
the visible form with the accidentals 
we spoke of. But the intellect is able 
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to abstract absolutely from all 
accidentals, and after abstraction the 
form remains stable in the intellect. 
It is right that universal meanings 
which have no relationship with 
matter and are free from extraneous 
accidentals should be intelligible by 
their essence and do not require 





There are two power of the soul: 
practical and the other for knowing. 
Ibn Sina says: 
‚A soul has two powers, one 
practical, the other for knowing. 
The practical power is called the 
practical intellect and is the 
source of moving the appetitive 
power in particular matters 
which require choice; these 
matters are abstracted by the soul 
from what is particular and 
sensible according to a universal 
abstraction. We have already 
spoken about its function, and 
that does not require repetition‛. 
 
The power for knowing is called 
the speculative intellect. It receives 
the essences of universal things in so 
far as they are universal. The 
perfection of this power is to become 
an intellect in act. From this aspect 
it has four levels: the first is that of 
preparedness to receive abstract 
intelligible forms before receiving 
them; this is called the material 
intellect and also the "niche" The 
second level is the power that results 
when it actually attains the first 
intelligible principles through which 
it passes to secondary intelligible 
principles. This occurs either by a 
motion of the mind from first to 
derived principles as it stretches to 
                                                 
16 Ibn Sina, al-Shifa, Book II, Chapter 5. 
seek the middle term in this case it is 
the "olive tree" or it occurs without 
any motion but grasps the middle 
term by one thrust and vision and 
this is the "oil". The first way is 
called reasoning, while the second is 
called intuition. Yet intuition can be 
very powerful or weak or mediocre. 
Weak intuition is the [second level] 
we mentioned; mediocre intuition is 
more powerful than that, and is 
called the habitual intellect or the 
"glass"; the most powerful and 
mature intuition is that holy power 
"whose oil would almost glow forth 
of itself though no fire touched it." If 
the speculative intellect reaches this 
perfection by having present the first 
and derived intelligible principles, 
and these are there actually and in 
full view without being absent, then 
the derived principles are related to 
the first as "light upon light"; this is 
the acquired intellect, because it 
derives from both kinds of 
principles. it the soul has mastery of 
intelligible principles and is able to 
recall them whenever it wants 
without effort or assistance, that 
power is called the intellect in act, 
and this is the "lamp" that it makes 
use of whenever it wants. The 
superior cause over and above these 
levels is the cause of the existence of 
the soul, since it flows over it; this is 
the "fire", which is the agent 
intellect.  
If you have paid attention to 
what I have said in the previous note 
about the way that leads to acquiring 
intelligible principles, you must 
know the difference between 
reasoning and intuition; that is, if 
you have really paid attention. 
If you have paid attention, your 
mind must not be unaware that 
intuition clearly exists, but that 
some people excel in it, others are 
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deficient, and others have an average 
amount. Likewise in reasoning, you 
find some people well prepared to 
receive intelligible principles, while 
others are prepared to a lesser degree 
and some to a lesser degree than 
that. According to these degrees 
they derive different benefit from 
reasoning; thus you find some who 
grasp many intelligible principles by 
one leap of their mind, without 
needing step by step learning; others 
grasp even more. Just as this power 
is stronger or weaker, and is 
sometimes so weak that a person has 
no intuition at all, so you can 
measure degrees of intensity and 
maturity until you come to those 
who need no step by step learning 
and no reflection. 
The soul's perception of 
intelligible things by its essence and 
its perception of sensible things 
occurs only by means of the senses. 
The senses can only be directed to 
sensible things and is affected by 
them. That is because when a sense 
is affected by a sensible thing the 
soul can be distracted; in that case 
there is no perception when the 
sense is affected. Thus it is clear that 
perception belongs strictly to the 
soul, for it perceives sensible forms 
by the senses and intelligible forms 
by means of sensible forms. 
Otherwise, if man were able to 
perceive the intelligibility of all 
things only by means of their 
sensibility, his soul would fall short 
of the level of absolute perception. 
But whenever there is something 
that understands by its essence, such 
as the Creator and separated 
substances, it perceives intelligible 
forms without need of the 
intermediacy of sensible forms. For 
these intelligible forms do not come 
from sensation but from occasions 
and causes. Yet man perceives such 
forms by abstracting universals from 
the particulars that he senses. His 
soul is potentially knowledgeable; 
thus the souls of children acquire 
first principles without the help of 
the senses. That is because their 
souls are prepared for them. You can 
easily understand that when the soul 
is separated, if it is ready for the 
perception of intelligible things, it 
has such perception without bodily 
powers. The acquisition of this 
perception comes without one's 
searching or being aware of it, just as 
first principles come to children, for 
the ways the soul makes use of 
knowledge are by the senses. 
If there is sensation of a thing 
and the soul does not perceive it, it 
is because it is occupied by thinking 
of other affairs or because of 
distraction or attention to something 
else. For when the common sense 
receives something, it must pass it 
on to the soul. If the thing does not 
reach the common sense, this is 
because the soul has put it to work 
on something that it is concerned 
with; so the thing does not reach it. 
The soul is prevented by the 
powers of the body from being alone 
with its essence and what is has 
perceived. For its perception is in an 
imaginary form and not absolutely 
intelligible, since the soul is drawn 
to sensible things; these take 
possession of it, and it does not get 
accustomed to intelligible things or 
knowledge of them. Rather it is 
content with the sensible world, 
trusting in it and not complaining 
about it. Thus one imagines that 
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Ibn Sina explains the relationship 
between the body and the soul. All 
these faculties are merely different 
functions of the human soul. For the 
human soul is one, and those three 
powers are different functions of it.
18
 
To Avicenna, the soul is immaterial, 
and is quite different from the 
substance of the body.
19
 It is not pre-
existent, coming into being together 
with the body;
20
 but it survives and 
does not perish when the human being 
dies. Avicenna says: ‘When the body 
dies and decays, the substance of the 
soul is released from its connection 
with the body; and if it is perfected in 
knowledge, wisdom and good deeds, 
it is drawn towards the divine lights, 
the lights of the angels and of the 
heavenly kingdom, just as a needle is 
drawn towards an enormous mountain 
by magnetic force; the divine 
presence flows over it, and it achieves 
real tranquility, as the call comes to it 
from the heavenly beings: "Oh soul at 
complete rest, return to thy Lord, well 
pleased and well pleasing. Enter then 




Ibn Sina says: 
                                                 
17 Ibn Sina, al-Shifa, Book II, Chapter 5. 
18 Ibn Sina, Ahwal al-Nafs, ed. by A.F. al-
Ahwani, Cairo, Dar Ihya al-Kutub al-Arabiyya, 
1371 AH, p. 108-10; al-Najat, p. 189 ff. 
19 Ibn Sina, al-Shifa, Vol. I, p. 248-57; 
Risalat fi marifat al-Nafs al-Natiqa, ed. by A.F. 
al-Ahwani, Cairo, Dar Ihya al-Kutub al-
Arabiyya, 1371 AH, p. 183-85. 
20 Ibn Sina, Risalat al-Quwwa al-Insaniyya wa 
Idrakatuha, Cairo, Matba at Kurdistan al-
‘Ilmiyya, 1328 AH, p. 212; Tis Rasa’il fil-
hikma wat-Tabi’iyat, Bombay, Kalzar Husna, 
1318 AH, p. 30. p. 97-98. 
21 Ibn Sina, Risala al-Shifa min Khawf al-
Mawt wa-Mualajat al-Ihtimam bihi, in the 
collection Jami’l-badi’, Cairo, Matba’at al-
Sa’ada, 1335 AH, p. 37-38. 
 
‚The soul comes to exist with the 
body. It is not possible for it to 
exist before the body, because in 
that case it would have to be 
either one soul or many. If there 
were one soul, the perceptions of 
one person would be the percep-
tions of all and vice versa, but 
that is impossible. Nor can it be 
maintained that while there is 
one soul perceptions differ 
because of different bodily condi-
tions and differences in purity or 
turbidity of the powers. For we 
have seen that the soul has no 
relationship with the body or its 
conditions except the 
relationship of managing and 
governing it, and that the 
differences of bodily conditions 
do not in any way at all affect the 
substance of the soul. But the 
body is only an instrument of the 
soul which it uses to acquire its 
universal perceptions from 
particular things that are present 
in the senses‛. 
 
But if there were many (pre-
existent) souls, they would either be 
different from one another or not. If 
not, then multiplicity would be 
impossible. But if there were diffe-
rences, they would either be intrinsic 
to the soul's reality or not. The first 
case is impossible, since its reality is 
the same and its substance is united; 
so its reality cannot accommodate an 
intrinsic difference. Nor can the 
difference of souls come from 
adjuncts, since a united reality can-
not have opposite differences, and 
before the existence of the body 
there are no differentiating acci-
dents. So its unification is not 
possible before it is involved in a 
body, since it is not a body or 
anything corporeal such as can 
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receive division and be multiplied. If 
it is false that the (pre-existent) soul 
is one and it is false that it is 
multiple, then it is false that it is 
pre-existent; rather it comes to exist 
together with the body. 
From the principles which we 
have laid down it is clear that the 
human soul which is the subject of 
intelligible forms is a substance 
which is not a body or in a body, nor 
does it need a body for the 
subsistence of its essence, or for the 
preservation of intellectual forms, or 
for its specific operations, but its 
relationship with the body is that the 
body may be its instrument in 
acquiring the perfection that it 
desires. Once it attains this, it no 
longer needs the body and is 
independent of it, especially if it has 
the power and stable habit to elicit 
perfect acts of understanding. It has 
no need for anything corporeal, nor 
to refer to the bodily world at all. It 
has also been established that the 
cause of its existence is permanent, 
and if the body decays, the soul has 
lost something it does not need to 
exist. This does not necessitate the 
corruption of its essence or the 
impeding of its operations and acts 
of understanding. In spite of bodily 
corruption the cause of the soul's 
existence is permanent and that 
necessitates the permanence of the 
soul after the corruption of the body. 
Whatever undergoes corruption 
must, before corruption, be capable 
of corruption. Since what subsists of 
itself does not have this capability, a 
corruptible thing must have a subject 
by which it subsists. This subject 
must exist when corruption takes 
place, because something which has 
the potentiality of undergoing 
corruption is the very thing that is 
said to undergo corruption. So it is 
established that whatever undergoes 
corruption must have matter. But the 
soul has no matter, as has been said 
above. Therefore it is incapable of 
corruption. 
Something which would come 
into being without the possibility of 
its coming into being cannot come 
into being, since the possibility of its 
coming into being is insufficient to 
bring it about. Therefore its reali-
zation is dependent on conditions. If 
these conditions are not found, the 
thing cannot exist. 
The existence of the body is a 
condition for the existence of the 
soul, without doubt. But the body is 
not a condition for the soul's 
permanence, since it has no need of 
the body. When it leaves the body, 
losing some perfection, it gains other 
perfections apart from it, since the 
body is not a condition of its 
perfection as it was for its coming 
into existence. If it is not a condition 
of its perfection, it is not surprising 
that the soul gains perfection after 
leaving the body. 
Animals do not understand their 
essences, because their souls are not 
separated from matter. They can 
only perceive their essences by their 
estimative power, not in an 
intelligible way. The soul of man can 
understand its own essence because 
it is separated from matter, and the 
intelligibility of anything is its 
separation from matter. This is the 




Finally, there is the group of 
faculties which distinguish the human 
being from the animal; in Avicenna’s 
                                                 
22 Ibn Sina, al-Shifa, Book II, Chapter 5. 
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view they comprise two faculties: an 
active faculty directing the human’s 
practical conduct, and a cognitive 
faculty directing his intellectual 
conduct. Both are given the name 
‘intelligence’, but the first is practical 




Social Nature of the Human Being 
According to Ibn Sina, the human 
being, as created by God, is not able 
to live in isolation but needs society 
for his survival, his growth and his 
education. In the book of Metaphysics 
X, Chapter 2, Ibn Sina says: 
‚We know say: it is known that 
man differ from the other animals 
in that he cannot lead a proper life 
when isolated as a single 
individual, managing his affairs 
with no associates to help him 
satisfy his basic wants. One man 
needs to be complemented by 
another of his species, the other, in 
turn, by him and one like him. 
Thus, for example, one man would 
provide another with vegetables 
while the other would bake for 
him; one man would sew for 
another while the other would 
provide him with needles. 
Associated in this way, they 
become self-sufficient.
24
 This is 





The whole of society must submit 
to the righteous holy law of God, 
through the Prophet who legislates it, 
guided by divine revelation. For 
                                                 
23 Ibn Sina, al-Najat, op. cit., p. 164; Risalat 
al-Quwwa al-Insaniyya wa Idrakatuha op. cit., 
p. 215-16. 
24 The Book of al-Shifa, Metaphysics, 
Chapter 2. 
25Ibn Sina, al-Najat, op. cit., p. 303; al-Sifa, 
op. cit., Vol. II, p. 556-57. 
 
society needs someone to legislate its 
affairs and this legislator must be a 
human being who stands out from the 
others through qualities which ensure 
that his word is obeyed and the whole 
people follow him. This is Avicenna’s 
justification for the existence of the 
Prophet, the specific miracles with 
which God distinguished him, and the 
need for the prophecy. Avicenna says: 
‘So it is necessary that there should 
be a Prophet, and necessary that he 
should be a human being, and also 
that he should possess a special 
quality not found in other people, so 
that they are aware of something in 
him not found in themselves; thus he 





Ibn Sina says: 
‚Whoever, in the endeavor to 
establish cities, does not see to the 
requirements necessary for setting 
up a city and, with his 
companions, remains confined to 
forming a mere association, would 
be engaged in devising means (to 
govern) a species most dissimilar 
to men and lacking the perfection 
of men. Nevertheless, even the 
ones like him cannot escape 
associating with the citizens of a 
city, and imitating them‚.  
 
In their life, human need law and 
justice, and law and justice demand a 
lawgiver and dispenser of justice. Ibn 
Sina says: 
If this is obvious, then man’s 
existence and survival require 
partnership. Partnership is only 
achieved through reciprocal transact-
ions, as well as through the various 
trades practiced by man. Reciprocal 
                                                 
26  Ibn Sina, al-Najat, op. cit., p. 304. 
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transactions demand law (sunnah) and 
justice, and law and justice demand a 
lawgiver and dispenser of justice. This 
lawgiver must be in a position that 
enables him address men and make 
them adhere to the law. He must, 
them be a human being. Men must not 
be left to their private opinions 
concerning the law so that they 
disagree, each considering as just 
what others owe them, unjust what 
they owe others. Thus, with respect to 
the universal and actual existence of 
the human species, the need for this 
human being is far greater than the 
need for such benefit as the growing 
of the hair on the eyebrow, the 
shaping of the arches in the feet, and 
many others that are not necessary for 
survival but at best are merely useful 
for it. Now the existence of the 
righteous man to legislate and to 
dispense justice is a possibility, as we 
have previously remarked. It becomes 
impossible; therefore, that divine 
providence should ordain the exis-
tence of those former benefits and not 
the latter, which are their bases. Nor 
yet is it possible that which He knows 
to be if itself within the realm pf 
possibility but whose realization is 
necessary for introducing the good 
order, should not exists?
27
 
In their life, human needs 
guidance, and the guidance brings by 
the prophet of God.  According to Ibn 
Sina, a prophet, there for, must exits 
and he must be human. He must also 
possess characteristics not present in 
others so that men could recognize in 
                                                 
27 Ibn Sina, Kitab al-Shifa, Maqalah al-
‘asyriyah, fasal tsani (Book of al-Shifa, 
Metaphysics X, Chapter 2 on the proof of the 
prophecy. The manner of the prophet’s call to 
God, the Exalted. The return to God, translated 
by Michael E. Marmura in Medieval Political 
Philosophy. 
him something they do not have and 
which differentiates him from them. 
Therefore he will perform the 
miracles about which we have spoken. 
When this man’s existence comes 
about, he must lay down laws about 
men’s affairs by the permission of 
God, the Exalted, by His command, 






Ibn Sina stresses the intimate 
connection of mind and body. Ibn 
Sina explains the relationship bet-
ween the body and the soul. All these 
faculties are merely different func-
tions of the human soul. For the 
human soul is one, and those three 
powers are different functions of it. 
To Avicenna, the soul is immaterial, 
and is quite different from the 
substance of the body. It is not pre-
existent, coming into being together 
with the body; but it survives and 
does not perish when the human being 
dies. Ibn Sina believed firmly in the 
immortality of the soul. Corruption 
cannot touch it, for it is immaterial. 
The human being, as created by 
God, is not able to live in isolation 
but needs society for his survival, his 
growth and his education. Human 
need law and justice, and law and 
justice demand a lawgiver and 
dispenser of justice. In their life, 
human needs guidance, and the 
guidance brings by the prophet of 
God.  According to Ibn Sina, a 
prophet, there for, must exits and he 
must be human. He must also possess 
characteristics not present in others so 
that men could recognize in him 
                                                 
28 Ibn Sina, Kitab al-Shifa, Metaphysics X, 
Chapter 2. 
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something they do not have and 
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